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*Seasia*SECRET/NODISMEMORANDUM TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Papers for NSC Meeting April 9

Attached are copies of four papers prepared at NSC Staff request for the NSC meeting on Wednesday. These papers have been prepared within the framework of the Ad Hoc Group for Indochina and reflect discussion in that Group, but are not cleared interagency papers.

Copies of these papers are being distributed to DOD, CIA, AID, as well as State.

George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Congressional Options on Cambodia Aid.
2. Congressional Options on Viet-Nam Aid.
3. Emergency Relief Through the UN for Communist Occupied Areas of South Viet-Nam and Cambodia.
4. Viet-Nam Evacuation.

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State Dept. review completed

Congressional Options on Cambodia Aid

It is probably too late for Congressional action on aid for Cambodia to have any ameliorative effect on the disintegrating situation in Phnom Penh. The city could be overrun, the GKR could collapse and the remaining Americans evacuated even before the President speaks on Thursday. The chances of this occurring before the Congress acts are even greater. In any case, the airlift of ammunition cannot continue beyond April 17, and stocks of ammunition in the country will last only a few days beyond that.

Against this grim backdrop, it is obvious that the Administration has few options. It needs an almost immediate favorable vote on any aid proposal to have any hope at all of postponing collapse. Within these narrow limits, we have the following options:

1) To accept the June 30 cutoff on the inadequate aid level of \$135.6 million (of which \$82.5 million is military). To accept the cutoff at this late date would mean prolonging Cambodia's agony briefly to little purpose. It would also absolve the Congress of a major responsibility for the collapse of the GKR.

2) To veto the June 30 cutoff. Unfortunately, vetoing the cutoff at this late date would now have the same effect: the Administration would be responsible for depriving a desperate GKR of a few more aid funds for its survival and of a few more months in which to negotiate an orderly transfer of power.

3) To urge the Congress not to act on the bill voted out of the SFRC or that voted down in the Hamilton sub-committee, on the grounds that these bills are inadequate and that the Administration continues to support its original request. Since the prospects for postponing the GKR's collapse are already so slim, this stance by the Administration would avoid any undesirable precedents which might be set by accepting or vetoing an aid cutoff.

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Congressional Options on Viet-Nam Aid

Our primary objective is to obtain as soon as possible the minimum mix of military and economic assistance required to stabilize the tactical and refugee situations. A second key objective is to demonstrate U.S. concern and thereby boost GVN morale which is in imminent danger of total collapse.

We believe that new military assistance needs arising out of the NVN offensive probably will exceed the difference between amounts authorized for assistance but not appropriated this fiscal year. The question is whether we should seek an additional military authorization immediately, act later within FY '75, or confine ourselves to supplemental appropriation requests, leaving additional funds until our forthcoming FY 1976 authorization requests.

Concerning our overall Congressional strategy, there are three options:

- Option I: Present a total emergency package on military and economic aid to meet immediate FY '75 needs for dramatic effect and candor. This package would include (1) the \$300 million military supplemental; (2) an additional military amount recommended by General Weyand as needed immediately; (3) an emergency economic/humanitarian appropriation requests which might not need to exceed the difference between AID's authorized and appropriated levies for FY '75; (i.e. \$167 million) and (4) if needed, a new supplemental economic authorization request.
- Option II: Split the package into two stages for purposes of speed and possibly more favorable consideration. Under this option we would request immediate passage of the \$300 million in the present military supplemental and initiate an economic authorization supplemental in an amount recommended by the Embassy but probably no larger than \$167 million. (In each case, this represents the difference between amounts authorized and appropriated.) At the same time, we would tell Congress that additional supplementals on the military side, (and in the economic area if indeed this is the case) will be needed. However, we would

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note that we will not report the specific amounts until an assessment is complete.

- Option IIa: Depending in part on Weyand's own recommendations and the legislative mood, there is a variation on Option II -- hold off the additional amounts required by Weyand until FY '76.
- Option III: Combine the approaches of Options I and II by seeking only the \$300 million in military aid now but at the same time going for a larger economic/humanitarian supplemental.

Option I (total package) offers the following pros and cons.

PROS:

- Maximum immediate psychological boost to the GVN which needs this gesture desperately.
- Represents a leveling with Congress by laying out the entire assistance needs at the same time.
- Timely exploitation of whatever improved popular mood exists for Viet-Nam before it is eroded by further reverses.
- Coat-tail effect of large parallel humanitarian package on our military request.

CONS:

- Size of request will complicate chances of passage.
- Any defeat would be disastrous on GVN morale.
- To make the additional military request may itself prejudice the chances for timely passage of the present \$300 million supplemental.

Option II (staged requests) has the following pros and cons:

PROS:

- Smaller figures may be easier to approve immediately.

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- Speedier passage enhanced by limiting first request to differences between appropriated and authorized amounts, thus avoiding authorization committees.
- If two above considerations are true, GVN morale may be boosted sooner.

CONS:

- Probable Congressional resistance to passage of immediate supplementals without knowing what our entire request will be (e.g., Weyand recommendations).
- Amounts obtained may be inadequate to needs of situation.
- Passage may prejudice consideration of later emergency request containing Weyand/Martin recommendations.

Option III (staged request for military aid, total request for economic/humanitarian aid) has the only advantage over Options I and II that it emphasizes the area for which there exists greatest Congressional receptivity. However, it suffers from the same disadvantage as Option I. The sum is likely to be too large for easy passage. Moreover, Option III does not provide maximum psychological boost for the GVN.

Under any of the above options, we believe that in our immediate presentation the amounts requested should not be related to the three year total package which recently we have been pushing. This concept, if indeed still viable, is best left to consideration in FY 1976. To coordinate this three year program with the emergency supplemental will, we suspect, only confuse the issue and detract from our primary purpose at this time, which is to secure additional assistance as soon as possible.

In response to the question of how the emergency bills square with the three-year supplemental, we should respond that it is too early to tell, thus keeping alive the three year concept for the time being.

We further recommend on the economic side that an all-out effort be made to obtain MSA status for Viet-Nam. This will require approaches by you to Humphrey and Hatfield.

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If they agree, MSA status itself will make available large amounts of PL 480 and other commodities without the need for any legislation. This move, therefore, could possibly obviate the need for new economic assistance beyond a \$177 million supplemental representing the difference between what was authorized and appropriated.

All three options have merit. There is, for example, no question that we will have a better chance for immediate passage of the \$300 million military package if we do not come in with a larger military request now. Balancing this, however, is the certainty that the tactical and psychological situation immediately requires military aid in excess of \$300 million. If we delay making the request, the additional amount probably will not be available until many months into FY '76, if at all. Any decision among the options rests on a judgment on Congressional and popular mood.

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EMERGENCY RELIEF THROUGH THE UN FOR COMMUNIST
OCCUPIED AREAS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA

The Problem

Should the United States show its continuing concern for the peoples of parts of Viet-Nam and Cambodia overrun by the Communists by financing and otherwise supporting the international relief programs in Communist-held territories? As a part of the humanitarian package which President Ford plans to send to Congress, should we include a request for funds for an international relief program? (Two FY-1975 supplemental bills already introduced by Senator Kennedy and by Senators McGee and Humphrey, reflecting considerable Congressional sentiment in favor of such aid, so provide.)

Background/Analysis

There are two situations: the present one with a minority of S. Vietnamese and Cambodians under Communist control; and the potential one of a Communist takeover of all these peoples. At present there are several million people in the areas of South Viet-Nam and Cambodia already overrun by the Communists. These people are undoubtedly in great need of relief assistance. Should the Communists take over full control of both countries, they would be administering some additional 20 million people. It is not possible at this time to assess relief needs in this eventuality. One major factor that should be borne in mind, however, is that the Communists would have the Mekong rice bowl which should mean the availability of adequate food.

The UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim has appealed to the countries of the world to respond to the needs in Indochina and has suggested that contributions be made to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). We have just received a joint UNICEF/UNHCR appeal for funds. Waldheim has named Sir Robert Jackson as coordinator for Viet-Nam Relief. The International Red Cross has issued a similar appeal. Further, the PRG issued a communique on March 28 calling for assistance from foreign governments and international organizations for the refugees.

We would envisage serious administrative problems on the part of international organizations in trying to carry out large

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scale relief programs in the Communist territories. Such organizations have traditionally relied heavily on local assistance in administering this type of program. There is considerable doubt about the ability of the PRG/KC to provide effective assistance in this regard, or their willingness to let UN personnel do the job or supervise relief distribution in-country.

At present such international organizations as UNICEF, UNHCR and the ICRC are providing modest assistance to the Communist areas of Viet-Nam and Cambodia but they have no staffs as yet in these areas. U. S. contributions to these Indochina-wide programs have been expressly limited to the non-Communist areas. U. S. statutes prohibit aid to North Viet-Nam and, perhaps by extension, to areas in South Viet-Nam taken over by NVN/PRG military force. Thus, there might have to be amendment of these statutes to permit U. S. aid to Communist controlled areas.

The Pro and Con of U. S. Assistance to People Under Communist Control in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia

Pro:

1. It would respond to considerable popular feeling in this country (as evidenced by the pending Kennedy-McGee-Humphrey bills) that the U. S., in view of its past military role, has an obligation to provide humanitarian aid to peoples in areas overrun by the Communists.
2. It would demonstrate to the world the strong U. S. humanitarian concern for all the victims of the Indochina fighting.
3. The presence of international aid personnel in these countries might have a marginal moderating effect on possible VC/KC reprisals.

Con:

1. Such U. S. assistance at this time could have a demoralizing effect on the GVN and the GKR. In a sense, we would be accepting the Communist takeover of these peoples and areas as well as the DRV's gross violations of the Paris Accords.
2. Larger-scale UN assistance to the PRG/KC could relieve problems of their handling populations under

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their control and thus facilitate their military operations against the GVN/GKR.

3. The PRG/KC could well have great difficulties in managing large scale international aid; high levels of aid might not be absorbed effectively.
4. Some circles in the U. S. would oppose such aid, would argue that the Soviets and Chinese have this responsibility and should bear this burden.

Options

1. That we oppose pending legislation with arguments that it would condone NVN/PRG/KC aggression and undercut the GVN/GKR, and that the programs would be hard to administer effectively.

Pro

- Would be consistent with our present policy of support for the GVN/GKR, would not undercut these governments.

- Would be consistent with our current efforts to focus direct humanitarian aid on the GVN/GKR. These efforts represent the most effective way we can provide aid in the current circumstances.

Con

- The Administration (in contrast to the Congress) would be shown as seeking to frustrate a desirable humanitarian goal.

2. That we go along with the thrust of the pending bills if this is the sense of Congress and the American people, while pointing out the pitfalls and seeking to ensure that aid is not provided directly to and through the PRG/KC.

Pro

- Would be less disheartening to the GVN/GKR than an Administration proposal for such aid.

- Would not provide a strongly negative U. S. image respecting humanitarian aid.

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Con

- Would still tend to diminish emphasis on and perhaps volume of aid to the GVN/GKR.
- Would project an equivocal U. S. position on humanitarian aid.

3. That the Administration submit a supplemental FY-1975 request for substantial humanitarian aid to the non-Communist areas, combined with a provision to furnish an additional but lesser amount (perhaps 25 per cent of the foregoing) to all areas of Indochina through international organizations; or that we seek to amend the pending Congressional bills so that they are not restricted to provision of aid through multilateral channels.

Pro

- It would keep the major emphasis on our programs for the non-Communist areas.
- It would demonstrate that we also have a significant interest in the welfare of peoples in the Communist-overrun areas.
- It would not appreciably hurt the GVN/GKR.

Con

- The Congress might not be satisfied with a reduced program to be funneled to all areas through international organizations, might press to make this the major part of the program.

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VIET-NAM EVACUATION

Evacuation of Americans -- Talon Vise. Talon Vise, the military emergency evacuation plan for Viet-Nam, exists as a conceptual plan, and is being fleshed out to reflect the recent dramatic changes in Viet-Nam. The plan sets forth the organization of the evacuation from Viet-Nam of all official, contract and private Americans and their dependents (6,026 as of December 31, 1974; 5,570 as of March 31, 1975).

Talon Vise consists of three options, which could be called into effect individually or in succession:

- 1) Evacuation by commercial air and sea facilities, augmented as necessary by military facilities at the request of the American Ambassador;
- 2) Evacuation by fixed wing military craft;
- 3) A sea lift evacuation, using small landing craft to transport people from Saigon and selected other sites to larger ships offshore.

The plan presents a number of problems:

- It assumes a stable rather than disintegrating situation at the airports and harbors, and a functioning, non-hostile government in power.
- Americans force requirements in the absence of these stable conditions have not been factored into the plan.
- The number of Americans and dependents in Viet-Nam is six times the total number of evacuees from Cambodia, but there are no provisions for safe escort from individual residences to embarkation points.
- Talon Vise does not include evacuation contingencies for any Vietnamese or third country nationals unless they are dependents of US citizens.

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Number of Potential Evacuees. The estimated number of potential evacuees, when Vietnamese and third country nationals are included, varies from about 100,000 to 1,000,000. The Embassy in Saigon on April 7 listed the potential evacuees at 173,719 (5,422 American citizens, 500 dependents of American citizens, 1,346 foreign diplomatic mission personnel, 606 ICCS members, 1,845 third-country nationals, and 100-150,000 local Vietnamese employees and their dependents. This list does not include relatives of Americans and dependents resident in Viet-Nam (estimated by one source to be 93,000) and several hundred thousand Vietnamese military and civilian officials and dependents whose lives might be in danger following a change of governments.

In any evacuation scenario many people arriving at evacuation points are not likely to be designated evacuees. In addition, there are likely to be large numbers of refugees at Vung Tau, Phu Quoc, or other refugee areas whom we might choose to designate as evacuees under certain circumstances. The total number of Vietnamese seeking evacuation could be much larger than the 100,000 - 200,000 anticipated. All figures are at the same time extremely soft -- depending first on political and military conditions in Viet-Nam at the time, and second, on whether the government in power is encouraging or discouraging the evacuation.

Categories of Evacuees. Rough categories might include:

1. American citizens and their dependents
2. Foreign diplomatic mission personnel
3. ICCS members
4. Third country nationals
5. Vietnamese presently employed by the USG
6. Close Vietnamese relatives of US citizens
7. Senior GVN military and civilian officials
8. Former Vietnamese employees of USG intelligence and security agencies
9. Former Vietnamese employees of other USG agencies
10. Non-official Vietnamese closely identified with the US (US educated, exchange visitors, employees of US companies or voluntary agencies, etc.)

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All statistical information is approximate. There is no statistical information for such categories as former employees, "riffed" when the American presence was reduced, or present/recent employees of US companies.

Evacuation Scenario. The key to any evacuation scenario is the timing of the decision to evacuate: once made it could trigger the disintegration of public order and the governmental process. There would seem to be three general scenarios:

1. Last minute panic scenario. (As in Nhatrang).

A long period of inaction during continued Vietnamese military withdrawals and psychological weakening followed by a decision to evacuate after the situation is seen to be hopeless is likely to lead to the kind of panic which accompanied the evacuation of Danang and Nhatrang. Unfriendly military units - either pro or anti government - are likely to be in a position to hinder any evacuation plan. Since the number of Americans in the Saigon area is large, the logistics of their extrication at the last minute would make a complete and successful evacuation nearly impossible. Under this scenario Americans might be left behind for the final disintegration.

Orderly evacuation of any categories of Vietnamese under these circumstances would be out of the question. Vietnamese evacuees might, however, be large in number, but would consist of those individuals who had made it out on the last planes or ships and who were already in refugee status aboard US vessels or at coastal refugee camps.

2. Quiet interim scenario. (As in Phnom Penh).

If circumstances permit a longer period of time from the date an evacuation is begun to the departure of the final group of Americans, the chance that nearly all Americans will be

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included is greatly increased. Likewise, a larger number of Vietnamese could be evacuated but, as we are seeing in Cambodia at this time, the key Vietnamese officials and USG employees probably could not leave in an orderly manner without triggering the final panic. Categories of desired groups and lists of desired individuals might prove meaningless.

Possible ways to buy a little time for a more orderly evacuation might include: 1) an order from Thieu or his successor that all non-essential foreigners depart Viet-Nam; 2) an agreement with an interim government for the immediate departure of certain categories of people, both Vietnamese and foreign; 3) the insertion of American military units at key evacuation points -- a process likely to be both bloody and undesirable.

3. Orderly departure scenario (as desired).

While all Americans and dependents might possibly make it out of Vietnam under scenarios 1 and 2, many could be left behind and casualties among the evacuees would be likely. Likewise under either of the first two scenarios, an orderly evacuation of desired groups of Vietnamese is unlikely. The third scenario would require the time and the political decision to permit an orderly evacuation of all members of both groups. An orderly evacuation would require a situation of tight discipline, a condition which under the circumstances might be difficult to impose.

Evacuation Assets. The principal present means for departure from Viet-Nam is commercial aircraft. As of April 4, Pan-American's twice weekly flights from Saigon were booked through April 22. Requests have been made for additional commercial flights but there have been no changes in flight frequency as yet. Approximately a dozen commercial ships are presently off the Vietnamese coast, shuttling refugees between Vietnamese ports, but not yet involved in the evacuation

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from Viet-Nam to other countries. Cargo ships travelling up the river to Saigon often return with less than full cargoes. We might encourage fuller use of this backhaul capacity for evacuation purposes.

As of April 4, 1975, MAC commercial airlift capability was up to 13 aircraft. There were also 77 military aircraft available in the West PAC area. If each of these planes were to make one flight out of Tan-son-nhut per day, these flights, at a rate of about 1 every 15 minutes, would overtax the existing facilities to organize and transport evacuees to staging areas. If each plane held an average of 200 persons (a low estimate), and all went well, 18,000 evacuees might depart each day.

There are a total of 13 commercial ships in the area which can be made available for evacuation purposes on five days notice (8 are presently committed to refugee movement). These ships can move from 26,000 evacuees (@ 2,000 per ship) to 104,000 (@ 8,000 per ship). The capability of the US military ships in the area is 18,700 evacuees (27,200 if those ships standing by for Cambodian evacuation are included). With additional notification, military ships with an added capability of 12,250 could be brought into the area from other Western Pacific ports. The principal bottleneck, as with the airlift capability will be the movement of evacuees in an orderly manner from the Saigon area where they are located to the ships standing off shore. The most likely means of movement would be LST and other small craft moving down the Saigon River toward Vung Tau.

According to the present evacuation plan, American evacuees would be sent to Taiwan and the Philippines. The presence of large numbers of Americans should not overtax the existing facilities at these two locations because the Americans would presumably move quickly back to the United States. No plans have been prepared for the temporary housing of tens of thousands of Vietnamese who would have no immediate onward destination. The likely closest destination of planes and ships from Viet-Nam would be Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, but there is likely to be great sensitivity in each of these places about receiving, even on a temporary basis, the large numbers of Vietnamese who might seek to flee.

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The Department of Defense believes that approximately 100,000 US and other personnel could be evacuated quickly from South Vietnam given 5 days advance notice and assuming free access to airfields and ports and the organizational capability to have the evacuees available for loading as required. All of these assumptions assume a best-case situation, which is a highly unlikely circumstance. In addition, we are working with a figure of 100,000 evacuees -- the lower end of any anticipated evacuation effort.

Conclusions

1. Given continuing military deterioration, an immediate thinning of American personnel is more than desirable; it is essential.
2. We should be presently taking every step to maintain or increase commercial transportation facilities out of Viet-Nam.
3. The existing resources, given the optimal circumstances, will not provide for the evacuation of all the Vietnamese we might wish to extricate.
4. The best-case scenario for bringing out a maximum number of evacuees would be the most difficult for USG-GVN relations: US actions to evacuate large numbers of Vietnamese along with Americans would be proof that the US was abandoning Viet-Nam.

For High-Level Determination

1. Will the US have to choose between the continuation of the Thieu Government (or its GVN successor) and the safety of Americans and Vietnamese who have supported USG efforts over the years?
2. If we choose a viable GVN, do we have adequate military forces on alert to assist in the extrication of a maximum number of Americans and Vietnamese if our policy fails? Would the Congress accept this use of US military force?

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3. Under any of the scenarios, the use of American military force remains a possibility. Should DOD put together a range of military options to meet various contingencies?
4. If we choose to evacuate large numbers of Vietnamese, are we prepared to a) open our doors to a large number of such refugees (A Presidential determination has already been forwarded to the President for signature.); b) appeal to other nations, including the DRV/PRG, and the UN to permit the evacuation and resettlement of large numbers of displaced Vietnamese?
5. We should begin preparing immediately a contingency plan for the resettlement of large numbers of Vietnamese, including temporary resettlement sites, appeals to humanitarian organizations for assistance, the desired role of the United Nations, and ultimate relocation sites.

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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Executive Secretary

8 April 1975
Date

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